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Abstract 
 
This paper offers additional insights on the interactions between economics and politics in 
Portugal. We use an unexplored data set consisting of monthly polls on vote intentions for 
the main political parties in Portugal, since 1986. Results indicate that: (1) socialist 
governments had less electoral support than social democratic governments; (2) social 
democratic governments enjoyed a honeymoon period with the electorate while socialist 
governments did not; (3) vote intentions for incumbent parties tend to decrease with time in 
office; (4) voters hold incumbents responsible for the evolution of the economy; (5) the 
socialists are more penalized for rises in unemployment than are the social democrats. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper offers additional insights on the interactions between economics and politics in 
Portugal. We use an unexplored data set consisting of monthly polls on vote intentions for 
the main political parties in Portugal over the interval from 1986 to 2001. Results indicate 
that: (1) other things equal, socialist governments had less electoral support than social 
democratic governments; (2) social democratic governments enjoyed a honeymoon period 
with the electorate while socialist governments did not; (3) favourable vote intentions for 
incumbent parties tend to decrease with time in office; (4) incumbents are held responsible 
for the evolution of the economy; (5) voters are retrospective but it is not possible to 
conclude whether they are egotropic or sociotropic. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: H80, E31, E60 
 
 
 
Keywords: vote intentions, responsibility hypothesis, Portugal, politics, economics 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
Although the literature analysing the interactions between economics and politics is 
quite extensive and has become one of the most active research areas in the last decades,1 
the number of studies investigating the Portuguese case is extremely small.2 With this paper 
we try to add information on this case by investigating the determinants of vote intentions 
for the main parties in Portugal. 
We use an unexplored data set consisting of monthly polls on vote intentions from 
1986 to 2001. Empirical results suggest that (1) other things held equal, socialist 
governments had less electoral support than social democratic governments; (2) 
honeymoon effects existed for social democratic governments but not for socialist 
governments; (3) longer time in office decreases vote intentions favouring the governing 
party; (4) economic outcomes, specially inflation and unemployment, negatively affect vote 
intentions on the governing party, providing evidence in favour of the responsibility 
hypothesis; (5) there is clear evidence that voters are retrospective but it is not possible to 
conclude whethr they are egotropic or sociotropic. 
 The paper consists of five parts. The first provides some background on political 
parties in Portugal. The second describes the data set and the third models the determinants 
of vote intentions. The fourth presents the mpirical results and, finally, the last part reports 
the conclusions. 
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Political parties in Portugal 
The military coup of April 25, 1974 re-established democracy in Portugal. It was 
followed by a two-year period of severe political instability during which the Junta of 
National Salvation and six temporary governments ruled the country. Following its 
approval, the new Constitution came into effect on April 25, 1976, and legislative elections 
where held in the same day. Since then, four political parties have dominated the 
Portuguese political life. The Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
have always been the two major political parties, and have alternated in power since 1976. 
The Communist Party (PCP) and the Social Democratic Cente / Popular Party (CDS/PP) 
have contested the third position and have always been in the opposition, except for a four-
year period (1979-83) in which CDS/PP participated in a government coalition led by PSD. 
Vote shares of these four political parties in legislative elections are shown in table 1. A 
brief description of their history follows. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here]
 
Portuguese Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Português - PS) 
This center-left party, founded in 1875, was declared illegal during the dictators ip
(1926-74). In the first legislative elections for the Assembly of the Republic held in April 
1976, the Socialist Party secured a plurality, with 34,98% of the votes. Mário Soares led the 
first Constitutional Government, and the following two, all of which came short of 
completing their terms. 
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In July 1985, Mário Soares decided to run for the Presidency. In October, the PSD 
won the legislative elections and the PS became part of the opposition.3 The party remained 
in the opposition until 1995, when it got 43,85% of the votes in the legislative elections. 
António Guterres, the party leader since 1992, became prime minister of a PS minority 
government. In the 1999 balloting PS had its best result ever, with 44% of the votes, which 
gave the party exactly 50% of the deputies in Parliament. 
 
Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata - PSD) 
This center-right party, founded in May 1974 as the Popular Democratic Party 
(PPD), adopted its current name in 1976. It remained in the opposition until 1979, when it 
formed the Democratic Alliance (AD) with the CDS and the Monarchic Popular Party 
(PPM). The AD won 42,24% of the votes in that year, getting an overall majority in 
Parliament. Sá Carneiro, leader and founder of PSD, became the prime minister in January 
1980. In the October 1980 elections the AD renewed its overall majority of deputies but, 
two months later, Sá Carneiro died in an airplane accident and Pinto Balsemão was elected 
head of PSD and became Prime Minister. 
In the 1983 legislative elections, PSD ran alone and gained the second-largest vote 
total. It then formed a coalition government with PS. In May 1985, Cavaco Silva was 
elected head of the Party and in June the PSD broke the coalition with PS and called for 
earlier elections. The President dissolved the Assembly and called for elections on October, 
in which PSD gained the largest share, with 29,79% of the votes. Cavaco Silva formed a 
minority government, which ended in April 1987 following a no confidence vote. 
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In the legislative balloting of July 1987, the PSD won the first one-party overall 
majority since the end of the dictatorship (with 50,15% of the votes), which was renewed in 
October 1991. In February 1995, Cavaco Silva abandoned the PSD leadership, and since 
the October 1995 elections the party has remained in the opposition. 
 
Social Democratic Center-Popular Party (Centro Democrático Social-Part do 
Popular/CDS-PP) 
This right-wing party, founded in 1974 as Democratic Social Center (CDS), added 
the designation of Popular Party (CDS-PP) in 1993. In July 1979, it formed an electoral 
front with the PSD and the PPM called Democratic Alliance (AD). This alliance won the 
1979 and 1980 elections, giving CDS the opportunity to be part of the government. Since 
1983, the CDS has remained in the opposition. In the January 1986 presidential balloting, 
the CDS candidate and former leader of the party, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, won 46% of 
the votes in the first round of voting. He was, however, defeated in the runoff by Mário 
Soares (PS). Paulo Portas h s led the party since March 1998.  
 
Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português - PCP) 
The Portuguese Communist Party was founded in 1921. It was banned in 1926 and 
legalized again in 1974. Between 1979 and 1986 the PCP formed the Popular Unity 
Alliance (Aliança Popular Unida - APU) with the small Portuguese Democratic Movement 
(MDP/CDE). In 1987, the PCP formed a new alliance, known as Unitary Democratic 
Coalition (Coligação Democrática Unitária - CDU) with dissidents of the MDP, 
independent leftists and the Green-Ecologist Party (PEV). Since 1991 the PCP has run with 
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PEV. Alvaro Cunhal was the leader of the party from the later years of the dictatorship until 
December 1992, when Carlos Carvalhas replaced him. The PCP was never a member of a 
constitutional government. 
 
The data 
The period analysed in this paper begins in June 1986 and ends in June 2001. It 
includes three terms of social democratic governments and two terms of socialist 
governments. Table 2 describes the winning parties of legislative elections since the 
balloting of October 1985.  
 
[Insert table 2 about here]
 
Vote intention data was obtained from a weekly national journal called Expresso. 
The source data is from polls conducted on a monthly basis by Euroexpansão employing a 
representative sample of about 600 Portuguese adults and conducted by telephone 
interviews. Economic data consists of monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted 
and standardized; consumer price indexes; industrial production indexes; real exchange 
rates; and a confidence indicator. Most were collected from OECD - Main Economic 
Indicators. Exchange rates were obtained from IMF - International Financial Statistics and 
data on the Portuguese consumers’ survey was collected from the National Institute of 
Statistics (INE). 
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Explaining vote intentions 
 The model we propose to explain vote intentions includes the following elements: 
leader characteristics, time in office, measures of the incumbent performance, and 
partisanship. It can be summarized in the following equation: 
 
VIt = a + b(L)VIt-1 + fLEADERt + hTIMEt  + gECOt-1 + d (PARTY*ECO) t-1 + ut (1) 
 
Where VIt, the dependent variable, is the percentage of vote intentions for the incumbent 
party at time t, and (L)VIt-1 are lags of the dependent variable. 
 Leader characteristics are taken into account by including a vector of dummy 
variables for the party leaders (LEADER). In this way, we control for personality factors 
that may influence vote intentions. In fact, electoral scholars commonly accept that more 
popular leaders increase party vote intentions.4 Table 3 describes the parties’ leadership 
positions during the period under consideration.   
 
[Insert table 3 about here]
 
 Time in office (TIME) can influence vote intentions in several ways. First, recently 
elected parties may benefit from a honeymoon period with the electorate. We control for 
honeymoon effects by including a variable that takes the value of six in the first month of 
each term, declines to one by the sixth month and takes the value of zero thereafter. 
Second, ruling is costly in terms of popularity and, therefore, we expect vote intentions to 
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decline with time in office. This is controlled by including a variable measuring the number 
of months in office or dummy variables for each term in office. 
 According to the r sponsibility hypothesis, vote intentions depend on voters’ 
evaluations of the incumbent’s performance. His/her ability to successfully manage the 
economy is therefore, the object of evaluation. The vector of variables (ECO) we use to 
measure economic conditions includes, among others, the unemployment rate, the inflation 
rate, and the confidence indicator.5 All variables are one month lagged since it takes time 
for economic data to be released and for individuals to recognize changes in economic 
conditions. 
 Because individuals’ vote intentions may depend upon partisan considerations 
(Swank, 1993), the economic variables are interacted with dummy variables indicating 
which party was in office. The underlying idea is that since left-wing incumbents 
concentrate in improving real conditions, while conservative parties are more concerned 
with controlling inflation (Hibbs, 1977), the demand for the type of policies each party 
advocates increases when the economic variables they are more concerned with worsen. 
Therefore, we expect left-wing oriented parties to benefit from increases in unemployment 
and right-wing parties to gain support when inflation rises. 
 Finally, we investigate whether individuals judge incumbents’ performance based 
on the evolution of their own economic situation (egotropic) or on national economic 
conditions (sociotropic). Numerous papers have discussed thi  issue, with the last 
hypothesis receiving more empirical support.6 We also try to determine if vote intentions 
depend on retrospectiv or prospective evaluations of economic performance. On this 
matter, the results found in the literature are less consensual. According to Nannestad and 
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Paldam (1994, p. 228) “it appears that past events work almost the same as expected future 
ones in explaining vote decisions.” The above-mentioned hypotheses are tested by adding 
to the previous equation a set of variables (CS) that consist of the responses to seven 
questions of the Portuguese Consumer Survey (see appendix 1). The equation used is, 
therefore: 
 
VIt = a + b(L)VIt-1 + fLEADERt + hTIMEt  + gECOt-1 + qCS t + ut (2) 
 
Results 
 In this section we present OLS estimations of the model described above. We start 
by considering as dependent variable the vote intentions for the governing party. Then, we 
consider the government lead over the main opposition party and, finally, the vote 
intentions for the opposition parties.7  
 
 Vote intentions for the governing party 
 Since June 1986, our first observation, only two parties have been in power (the 
PSD, from 1985 to 1995; and the PS, since 1995), and all governments were single party. 
Results for our first set of estimations, which uses as dependent variable the percentage of 
vote intentions for the party in government, are shown in Table 4. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
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 In the estimation reported in column 1, we use as independent variables the first lag 
of the dependent variable (VI_GOV),8 a dummy (Guterres) that takes the value of one when 
Guterres is Prime Minister and zero otherwise, two variables accounting for honeymoon 
effects for the two parties (H_PS and H_PSD), the number of months in office (Time_Gov), 
and the one-month lagged values of the inflation rate (Inflation),9 the unemployment rate 
(Un_Rate), and the confidence indicator (Conf_Indicator). Results show that vote 
intentions for the party in office are positively affected by their value in the last month and 
by honeymoon effects (only for the PSD). They also suggest that vote intentions are smaller 
when Guterres is Prime Minister (PS is in off ce), and that they tend to decrease with time 
in office and with increases in inflation or unemployment. Results regarding inflation and 
unemployment clearly support the responsibility hypothesis. As the confidence indicator 
does not seem to influence vot intentions, it was excluded from the following 
estimations.10 
 We then use alternative variables to control for the effects of time in office. 
Separating time in office for the PS and the PSD (Time_Gov_PS and Time_Gov_PSD) 
reveals that vote intentions for both governing parties declined with time in office, with the 
latter party being more severely penalized (column 3). When using dummy variables for 
terms in office (column 4), there is clear evidence of vote intentions decreases over 
consecutive terms, and that both PS mandates were less popular than the first two PSD 
mandates.11  
 Partisan effects are taken into account in the estimation of column 5 by multiplying 
the economic variables by a dummy variable that takes the value of one when PS is in 
office.12 Results indicate that voters do not tend to distinguish between PS and PSD 
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governments when penalising them for higher inflation or unemployment, since the 
interaction terms are never statistically significant. Therefore, we do not find support for 
Swank’s partisan (1993) hypothesis.13 
 
Government lead over the major opposition party 
Table 5 shows the results of four estimations using as dependent variable the 
difference between the percentage of vote intentions for the party in office and that for the 
major party in the opposition. 
 
[Insert table 5 about here]
 
 Results further confirm those reported in table 4. As before, there is strong evidence 
supporting that of the lagged dependent variable and the honeymoon variable for the PSD 
have positive effects on government lead. Furthermore, the government lead is lower when 
Guterres is prime minister and tends to decrease with time (months) in office, inflation, and 
unemployment. Further, the honeymoon variable for the PS governments and the 
confidence indicator14 are not statistically significant. 
 When controlling for partisan effects (columns 3 and 4), there is strong evidence 
that the government lead decreases more during socialist governments than during social 
democratic incumbencies when unemployment rises. These results contradict Swank’s 
partisan (1993) hypothesis. Alternatively, we think that since the socialist political program 
attributes higher priority to improvements in real economic conditions than the social 
democratic program, Portuguese voter interpret a rise in the unemployment rate during a 
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socialist government as revealing more government incompetence than if it had occurred 
during a social democratic incumbency. Co erning price increases or the confidence 
indicator, voters do not seem to discriminate between PS and PSD governments. 
 
Vote intentions for the opposition parties
Finally, we decided to analyse vote intentions for the opposition parties. First, using 
as dependent variable the vote intentions for the major opposition party15 and as
explanatory variables those used in the estimations reported in Table 4. As expected, the 
significance of the variables was the same as for vote intentions for the governing party, 
and the signs of the estimated coefficients were symmetrically opposite.16 
 Then, we performed estimations for the other two important opposition parties, 
CDS/PP and PCP. Recall that these two parties were never in office during the period under 
analysis. Therefore, their vote intentions were modelled as functions of previous values of 
the vote intentions, leader characteristics, and economic variables. Results are shown in 
table 6. 
 
[Insert table 6 about here]
 
 Two main conclusions are suggested by the analysis of these estimations. First, vote 
intentions for CDS/PP and PCP do not seem to be affected by their leaders’ personalities. 
Second, both parties get higher vote intentions when the economy gets worse: the CDS/PP 
benefits from decreases in the confidence indicator, while the PCP gains from inflation and 
unemployment increases. These results provide some additional evidence in favour of the 
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responsibility hypothesis. Voters blame incumbent parties for bad economic results and, 
therefore, during economic hardships, opposition parties’ proposals receive more support. 
 
Vote intentions using INE’s Consumer Survey 
In this section, we investigate some microeconomic aspects of the vote intentions 
function, namely, whether voters are egot opic or sociotropic, and whether they are 
prospective or retrospective. As far as we know, these issues have never been investigated 
for the Portuguese case. We use for this purpose, the National Institute of Statistics’s (INE) 
monthly Consumer Survey that consists of twelve questions. Data from seven of those 
questions will be used in our estimations. They are related to the past and expected future 
economic situation of the household or country, inflation, and unemployment. A complete 
description of these variables is given in appendix 1. 
Since the economic situation of the households tends to be highly corr lated with 
that of the country, and most people have rather static expectations, it is not surprising that 
there is very high correlation between some of the variables resulting from the Consumer 
Survey (see the correlation matrix in appendix 2). This makes it impractical to include more 
than one variable concerning the past or expected economic situation of the 
country/household in the same estimation, since it would lead to serious problems of 
multicollinearity. 
The empirical results are presented in table 7. We started by testing whether voters 
are prospective or retrospective. The estimation of column 1 combines inflation and 
unemployment, representing past economic performance, with the economic situation of 
the country expected for the next 12 months.17 Since the first two are statistically 
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significant while the latter is not, there is evidence in favour of a retrospective evaluation of 
the economy. Exactly the same happens in the estimation of column 2, where inflation is 
replaced by the perceived price increases in the last 12 months.18 
 
[Insert table 7 about here]
 
 In column 3, inflation and unemployment are combined with the price increases and 
unemployment expected for the next 12 months. Again, the first two are statistically 
significant while the variables representing expectations are not. The same happens in 
column 4, where inflation is replaced by the perceived price increases in the last 12 months. 
The estimation of column 5 includes the economic situation of the country in the last 12 
months, together with expected inflation and unemployment. Once again, the variable 
representing past performance is statistically significant while those related to expectations 
are not. Thus, we can safely argue that there is clear evidence of retrospective evaluations 
of economic performance. 
 In the last three estimations reported in table 7 we try to determine whether 
Portuguese voters are egotropic or sociotropic. The estimation of column 6 includes 
perceived price increases in the last 12 months and the unemployment rate, representing the 
situation of the country, and the economic situation of the household in the last 12 
months.19 The fact that the latter is not statistically significant may be interpreted as 
evidence in favour of sociotropic behaviour. Similar results are obtained when we use the 
expected economic situation of the household instead of the past situation (column 7). But, 
when we combine the past economic situation of the household with expected inflation and 
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unemployment (column 8), only the first is statistically significant. This indicates, at the 
same time, gotropic and retrospective behaviour. 
In sum, while all estimations shown in table 7 present evidence in favour of a 
retrospective evaluation of the economy, it is difficult to con lude whether voters are 
egotropic or sociotropic. Concerning the other variables, there is again evidence of 
personality, honeymoon and time effects on the vote intentions on the party in government. 
 
Conclusions 
 The main objective of this paper was to investigate the determinants of vote 
intentions in Portugal. Do they depend on who is leading the party? Do the Portuguese 
blame incumbents for the evolution of the economy? Does time in office influence vote 
intentions? Are voters retrospective or prospective, egotropic or sociotropic? These are 
some of the questions that provided the starting point for the research. In order to answer 
them, we used an unexplored data set consisting of vote intentions obtained from monthly 
polls performed since 1986. 
 Our results provide an additional light on the interactions between economics and 
politics in Portugal. In previous research, Veiga (1998) estimated popularity functions for 
the main political entities in Portugal. She found strong evidence in favour of the 
responsibility hypothesis, with unemployment, and to a lesser extent inflation, affecting 
popularity levels. Results found in this paper corroborate this conclusion: vote intentions in 
the incumbent party increase when the economy is performing well, while vote intentions 
in the opposition rise in the reverse case. Concerning partisan considerations, estimations 
using as dependent variable the government lead over the main opposition party suggest 
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that the socialists are more penalized for rises in unemployment than the social democrats, 
which contradicts Swank’s (1993) partisan hypothesis. 
 According to the survey of Nannestad and Paldam (1994), most studies conclude 
that voters are sociotropic but there is no clear pattern on whether voters are prospective or 
retrospective. On the contrary, our results reveal that Portuguese voters are retrospective, 
but it is not possible to determine if they are sociotropicor egotropic. 
 Our analysis also reveals that: (1) PS governments had less electoral support than 
PSD governments; (2) PSD governments enjoyed a honeymoon period with the electorate 
during the first months of incumbency while PS governments did not; (3) vote intentions in 
incumbent parties tend to decrease with time in office. 
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1 See Nannestad and Paldam (1994) for a survey on vote-popularity functions and Person and Tabellini (2000) 
for a recent survey on political economics. 
2 Veiga (1998) estimated popularity functions for the Portuguese President of the Republic, Prime Minister, 
Government and Parliament. 
3 In February 1986, Mário Soares won the second runoff of the most closely contested presidential election so 
far. He become the first civilian President of the Republic since 1974 and was elected President for a second 
term in 1991. In 1996, Jorge Sampaio, also a former PS leader, succeeded himin th  Pr sidency. 
4 See Lanoue and Headrick (1994) for a study focusing on Great Britain. 
5 The confidence indicator is the average of consumer responses to a set of five questions regarding personal 
and national, present and future, economic conditions, extracted from the Portuguese Consumer Survey. 
These questions and the construction of the confidence indicator are explained in Appendix 1. 
6 Refer to Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) for the U.S. and Lewis-Beck (1988) for comparative results of Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy and the U.S. Nannestad and Paldam (1995) is a clear exception. They argue that, in 
Denmark, the egotropic effect on vote is stronger than the sociotropic one. 
7 Unit-root tests performed for these series indicate that all of them are stationary. 
8 The number of lags of the dependent variable was chosen according to their statistical significance, in order 
to minimize the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), and to avoid problems of autocorrelation.   
9 The inflation rate is defined as the percentage change in the Portuguese consumer price index since the same 
month of the previous year (homologous inflation rate). 
10 When the confidence indicator is excluded from the estimation of column 1, t-statistics for the other 
variables and the F-statistic of the equation rise and the SBIC falls (see column 2).  
11 The term left out of the regression was PSD’s first (Term1_PSD). The dummy variable Guterres was not 
included in this estimation because it is equal to the sum of Term1_PS and Term2_PS. 
12 The resulting variables are: (Inflation*PS), (Unemp_Rate*PS), and (Conf_Indicator*PS). 
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13 Other economic variables, for which monthly data is available, such as the change in the industrial 
production index or in the real exchange rate, were added to the estimations. Results, not reported here, did 
not change significantly. 
14 As in table 4, when the confidence indicator is excluded from the estimation of column 1, t-statistics for 
most of the other variables and the F-statistic of the equation rise and the SBIC falls (see column 2).   
15 From 1986 to October 1995, the Socialist Party and, since then, the Social Democratic Party.
16 Since results are very similar to those of table 4 (with the inverse signs), they are not reported here. They 
are, however, available from the authors upon request.
17 It is not possible to put the Econ. Sit. Country (last 12 months) a d Econ. Sit. Country (next 12 months) in 
the same estimation because the correlation between these variables is very high (85,3%). 
18 Since the INE’s Consumer Survey does not include a question on perceived unemployment, we kept the 
unemployment rate in the set of explanatory variables. 
19 It is not possible to join the economic situation of the country with that of the household in the same 
estimation because that would lead to problems of multicollinearity. The correlation between the variables 
reflecting the last 12 months is 93,3% and that for the expectations for the next 12 months is 95,7%. That is, 
the situation and expectations for the households are very similar to those of the country. 
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Table 1: Legislative electoral results 
 PS PPD/PSD CDS/PP AD PCP 
1976 34,98% 24,03% 15,89% - 14,5% 
1979 27,43% - - 42,24% 18,96%(2) 
1980 27,13%(1) - - 44,4% 16,92%(2) 
1983 36,35% 27,04% 12,38% - 18,2%(2) 
1985 20,82% 29,79% 9,74% - 15,55%(2) 
1987 22,3% 50,15% 4,34% - 12,18%(3) 
1991 29,25% 50,43% 4,38% - 8,8%(4) 
1995 43,85% 34% 9,09% - 8,61%(4) 
1999 44% 32,3% 8,4% - 9%(4) 
Notes: PS – Socialist Party; PPD/PSD – Popular Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party; 
CDS/PP – Social Democratic Center / Popular Party; AD - Democratic Alliance (PSD + 
CDS + PPM - Monarchic Popular Party); PCP – Portuguese Communist Party. 
 (1) Socialist Revolutionary Front (FRS): PS + small socialist parties. 
 (2) Popular Unity Alliance (APU): PCP + MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement). 
 (3) Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU): PCP + dissidents of MDP + PEV (Green-Ecologist Party). 
 (4) PCP + PEV 
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Table 2: Legislative elections and parties in government 
Dates of 
elections 
Winning 
party 
Share in 
Parliament Prime Minister 
Form of 
government 
     October 5, 1985 
July 19, 1987 
October 6, 1991 
October 1, 1995 
October 10, 1999 
PSD 
PSD 
PSD 
PS 
PS 
34% 
59% 
58% 
48% 
50% 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
António Guterres 
António Guterres 
One party, minority 
One party 
One party 
One party, minority 
One party 
Note: PSD – Social Democratic Party; PS – Socialist Party. 
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Table 3: Party leaders since June 1986 
PS PSD CDS/PP PCP 
Leader Period Leader Period Leader Period Leader Period 
Victor 
Constâncio 
6/86 -
12/89 
Cavaco 
Silva 
5/85-
1/95 
Adriano 
Moreira 
10/1985-
1/1988 
Álvaro 
Cunhal 
Until 
11/92 
Jorge 
Sampaio 
1/89-
1/92 
Fernando 
Nogueira 
2/95-
3/96 
Freitas do 
Amaral 
2/88-
10/91 
Carlos 
Carvalhas 
12/92-
present 
António 
Guterres 
2/92 -
present 
Marcelo 
Rebelo de 
Sousa 
4/96-
3/99 
Adriano 
Moreira 
11/91-
2/92 
  
  Durão 
Barroso 
4/99 - 
present 
Manuel 
Monteiro 
3/92-
2/98 
  
    Paulo 
Portas 
3/98-
present 
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Table 4: Vote Intentions for the Party in Government 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      Constant 32.21 
(5.74)*** 
32.32 
(6.01)*** 
32.49 
(6.05)*** 
22.98 
(5.26)*** 
34.52 
(5.39)*** 
      VI_GOV (-1) .53 
(9.92)*** 
.53 
(9.96)*** 
.52 
(9.67)*** 
.64 
(14.06)*** 
.50 
(8.88)*** 
      Guterres -5.10 
(-2.91)*** 
-5.15 
(-3.18)*** 
-6.42 
(-3.42)*** 
 -4.10 
(-1.08) 
      H_PS -.11 
(-.45) 
-.11 
(-.45) 
-.08 
(-.34) 
-.03 
(-.14) 
-.09 
(-.39) 
      H_PSD 1.19 
(5.47)*** 
1.19 
(5.63)*** 
1.25 
(5.80)*** 
1.39 
(6.09)*** 
1.23 
(5.61)*** 
      Time_Gov. -.08 
(-4.03)*** 
-.08 
(-4.81)*** 
  -.09 
(-4.70)*** 
      Time_Gov_PS   -.05 
(-2.32)** 
  
      Time_Gov_PSD   -.08 
(-5.00)*** 
  
      Term2_PSD    -3.05 
(-2.72)*** 
 
      Term3_PSD    -5.50 
(-3.75)*** 
 
      Term1_PS    -4.67 
(-2.45)** 
 
      Term2_PS    -6.45 
(-2.81)*** 
 
      Inflation (-1) -.62 
(-3.38)*** 
-.62 
(-3.43)*** 
-.63 
(-3.51)*** 
-.38 
(-2.15)** 
-.71 
(-3.19)*** 
      (Inflation*PS) (-1)     .39 
(.81) 
      Unemp_Rate (-1) -.70 
(-2.21)** 
-.71 
(-2.75)*** 
-.59 
(-2.14)** 
-.47 
(-1.78)* 
-.62 
(-1.90)* 
      (Unemp_Rate*PS) (-1)     -.54 
(-1.60) 
      Conf_Indicator (-1) .002 
(.07) 
    
            Adjusted R2 .77 .77 .77 .75 .77 
      # Observations 175 175 175 175 175 
      
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes:  - t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated by OLS.
 24 
Table 5: Government lead over the major opposition party 
 1 2 3 4 
     Constant 30.16 
(4.48)** 
27.33 
(4.50)*** 
30.31 
(4.08)*** 
32.22 
(4.26)*** 
     Gov_Lead (-1) .56 
(10.29)*** 
.56 
(10.56)*** 
.50 
(8.71)*** 
.48 
(8.06)*** 
     Guterres -8.53 
(-3.33)*** 
-7.43 
(-3.23)*** 
-3.97 
(-.74) 
-4.75 
(-.88) 
     H_PS -.48 
(-1.35) 
-.49 
(-1.36) 
-.49 
(-1.38) 
-.35 
(-.96) 
     H_PSD 1.61 
(5.08)*** 
1.53 
(5.00)*** 
1.68 
(5.35)*** 
1.70 
(5.09)*** 
     Time_Gov. -.15 
(-4.84)*** 
-.13 
(-5.27)*** 
-.16 
(-5.44)*** 
-.17 
(-5.30)*** 
     Inflation (-1) -1.02 
(-3.81)*** 
-1.96 
(-3.69)*** 
-1.14 
(-3.59)*** 
-1.25 
(-3.81)*** 
     (Inflation*PS) (-1)   .73 
(1.04) 
.02 
(.02) 
     Unemp_Rate (-1) -1.66 
(-3.39)*** 
-1.37 
(-3.52)*** 
-1.15 
(-2.42)** 
-1.17 
(-2.22)** 
     (Unemp_Rate*PS) (-1)   -1.33 
(-2.70)*** 
-1.45 
(-2.91)*** 
     Conf_Indicator (-1) -.05 
(-.97) 
  .02 
(.39) 
     (Conf_Indicator*PS) (-1)    -.20 
(-1.58) 
          Adjusted R2 .80 .80 .81 .81 
     # Observations 175 175 175 175 
     
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes: - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; 
**, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Models estimated by OLS; 
- Government lead was defined as the difference between the vote 
intentions for the party in government and the major party of the 
opposition. 
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Table 6: Vote Intentions on CDS/PP and PCP 
    CDS/PP CDU 
   Constant 1.39 
(1.28) 
1.54 
(2.96)*** 
   Vote Int. (-1) .56 
(7.08)*** 
.18 
(2.53)** 
   Vote Int. (-2) .09 
(1.30) 
.33 
(4.71)*** 
   Leader1 -.15 
(-.11) 
-.35 
(-.70) 
   Leader2 -.04 
(-.05) 
 
   Leader3 .11 
(.12) 
 
   Leader4 -.42 
(-.77) 
 
   Inflation (-1) -.03 
(-.43) 
.15 
(2.69)*** 
   Unemp_Rate (-1) .06 
(.34) 
.15 
(2.14)** 
   Conf_Indicator (-1) -.05 
(-2.78)*** 
.02 
(1.63) 
      Adjusted R2 .65 .60 
   # Observations 172 172 
   
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes: - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Models estimated by OLS. 
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Table 7: Vote Intentions using INE’s Consumer Survey 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         Constant 30.03 
(5.22)*** 
23.92 
(5.99)*** 
32.84 
(5.56)*** 
27.46 
(6.21)*** 
15.42 
(6.73)*** 
28.63 
(4.86)*** 
24.66 
(6.36)*** 
16.30 
(6.99)*** 
         VI_GOV (-1) .57 
(10.23)*** 
.61 
(12.36)*** 
.57 
(10.23)*** 
.59 
(11.8)*** 
.64 
(12.99)*** 
.56 
(10.26)*** 
.61 
(12.34)*** 
.64 
(12.85)*** 
         Guterres -5.07 
(-2.83)*** 
-2.53 
(-2.40)** 
-5.15 
(-2.96)*** 
-3.71 
(-3.47)*** 
.55 
(.90) 
-4.77 
(-2.67)*** 
-2.75 
(-2.91)*** 
.18 
(.33) 
         H_GOV .57 
(3.60)*** 
.53 
(3.34)*** 
.57 
(3.77)*** 
.51 
(3.41)*** 
.53 
(3.48)*** 
.58 
(3.97)*** 
.55 
(3.50)*** 
.53 
(3.43)*** 
         Time_Gov. -.07 
(-3.50)*** 
-.03 
(-2.73)*** 
-.07 
(-3.86)*** 
-.05 
(-3.94)*** 
-.01 
(-1.31) 
-.06 
(-3.03)*** 
-.04 
(-3.32)*** 
-.02 
(-1.65)* 
         Inflation (-1) -.60 
(-3.17)*** 
 -.56 
(-2.88)*** 
  -.57 
(-3.02)*** 
  
         Unemp_Rate (-1) -.61 
(-2.12)** 
-.42 
(-1.78)* 
-.95 
(-2.28)** 
-.74 
(-1.88)* 
 -.38 
(-1.05) 
-.48 
(-2.03)** 
 
 
         Econ. Sit. Country 
(last 12 months) 
    .06 
(2.53)** 
   
         Econ. Sit. Country 
(next 12 months) 
.02 
(.85) 
-.007 
(-.22) 
      
         Price increases 
(last 12 months) 
 -.10 
(-3.40)*** 
 -1.14 
(-3.63)*** 
  -.10 
(-3.62)*** 
 
         Price increases 
(next 12 months) 
  -.04 
(-1.06) 
.03 
(.70) 
-.03 
(-1.01) 
  -.03 
(-1.20) 
         Unemployment 
(next 12 months) 
  .008 
(.39) 
.03 
(1.54) 
.02 
(1.46) 
  .03 
(1.61) 
         Econ. Sit. Household 
(last 12 months) 
     .08 
(1.33) 
 .15 
(2.26)** 
         Econ. Sit. Household 
(next 12 months) 
      -.03 
(-.66) 
 
 
                  Adjusted R2 .75 .75 .75 .75 .74 .75 .75 .74 
         # Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 
         
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, National Elections Commission, and INE.
Notes:  - t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%;
- models estimated by OLS.
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Appendix 1 
 
The seven questions from the National Institute of Statistics’s (INE) monthly Consumer 
Survey that we use in this paper are the following:
 
1. In your opinion, during the last 12 months, y ur 
household’s (family) economic situation…  
a. improved a lot 
b. improved a little 
c. did not change 
d. worsened a little 
e. worsened a lot
f. does not know 
 
2. In your opinion, during the next 12 
months, your household’s (family) 
economic situation…  
a. will improve a lot 
b. will improve a little 
c. will not change 
d. will worsen a little 
e. will worsen a lot 
f. does not know 
 
3. In your opinion, during the last 12 months, the 
general economic situation of the country 
a. improved a lot 
b. improved a little 
c. did not change 
d. worsened a little 
e. worsened a lot 
f. does not know 
 
4. In your opinion, during the next 12 
months, the general economic situation of 
the country… 
a. will improve a lot 
b. will improve a little 
c. will not change 
d. will worsen a little 
e. will worsen a lot 
f. does not know 
 
5. In your opinion, during the last 12 months, 
prices… 
a. increased a lot 
b. increased 
c. increased a little 
d. did not change 
e. decreased a little 
f. does not know 
6. In your opinion, having the current 
situation in mind, do you think prices, 
during the next 12 months… 
a. will increase more rapidly 
b. will increase as much as now 
c. will increase l ss rapidly 
d. will stay the same 
e. will decrease slightly 
f. does not know 
 
7. In your opinion, during the next 12 months, 
national unemployment…  
a. will increase a lot
b. will increase a little 
c. will not change 
d. will decrease a little 
e. will decrease a lot 
f. does not know 
 
 
 28 
For each question, the result is the weighted difference of the percentages of positive and 
negative answers, using the following equation: 
( ) ( )edbaQi +-+= 5.05.0  (3) 
where a,b,d and e are the percentages of respondents choosing the respective options. 
 
 
Confidence Indicator: 
 
The Confidence Indicator corresponds to the simple arithmetic average of the results 
obtained for five questions of the Consumer Survey: questions 1 to 4, shown in the 
previous page, and the following question: 
8. Do you think that, for people in general, this is a good time to buy important 
durable goods, such as furniture, washing machines, TV sets, VCRs, 
computers, etc.? 
a. Yes, it is a good time 
b. It is neither a good nor a bad time 
c. No, it is not a good time. Those acquisitions should be postponed 
d. does not know 
 
The result for this question is the difference between the percentage of respondents 
choosing option a and option c. That is: 
caQ -=8  (4) 
 
Then, the Confidence Indicator is obtained using the following equation: 
( ) 5/84321 QQQQQCI ++++=  (5) 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Data on the first seven questions of the Consumer Survey 
 
 
       Q 1       Q 2       Q 3       Q 4       Q 5       Q 6      Q 7   
Q1   1.00000                                                             
Q2   0.85369   1.00000                                                   
Q3   0.93390   0.89532   1.00000                                         
Q4   0.80934   0.95718   0.91517   1.00000                                
Q5   0.02153   0.10747   0.04071   0.02650   1.00000                     
Q6  - 0.04375  - 0.28544  - 0.17452  - 0.40850   0.51535    1.00000          
Q7  - 0.83320  - 0.66293  - 0.72650  - 0.62785  - 0.08003   - 0.04018   1.0000  
 
 
 
 
 
